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For this reader, and perhaps for most lawyers, Mr. Yarmolinsky's
collection of cases will at least have shifted the burden of going for-
ward to the proponents of the present standard.
ABRw J. Ctxys *
THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING Op SociAL SCIENCES: LAW. Report Pre-
pared by Charles Eisenmann 1 for the International Committee of
Comparative Law. Paris: UNESCO. 1954. Pp. 133. $1.OO.
Professor Charles Eisenmann's essay on the aims and nature of legal
education is the redeeming feature of this otherwise pedestrian report.
Eleven countries are briefly surveyed in order to provide a picture of
organized instruction in the law. The criteria of selection are unex-
plained. The countries: Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, India,
Lebanon, Mexico, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia.
The primary distinction in the mind of Professor Eisenmann and pre-
sumably in the minds of his principal collaborators is between systems
of instruction "for purely practical ends" and for scientific purposes.
Law teaching for practical purposes is said to have the following char-
acteristics: "[I] t will be concerned only with the law of [the home]
. . . state .... "; "its whole attention will be turned to . . . prob-
lems . . . concerning the treatment or solution of concrete cases in the
light of the general state of the rules of national law. . . ."; "the in-
tellectual qualities which it will mainly seek to develop . . . will be
those of deductive reasoning, the greatest importance being assigned to
deductive logic." (pp. 23-24)
Professor Eisenmann gives a tactful and incisive refutation of the idea
that the work of a lawyer consists of the deductive application of a sys-
tem of exhaustive and univocal legislative rules to the "facts" of cases.
He underlines the point that no national system is wholly isolated from
other systems, and emphasizes the fact that practical requirements call
for acquainting the bar with "common and commercial law, as well as
the judicial organization and procedure, of foreign countries." (p. 27)
Foreign systems of public law are of much practical concern to "diplo-
mats, employees of the national ministry of foreign affairs, and senior
or intermediate officials in all government departments dealing with the
international handling of their particular business." (p. 28) Further-
more, this consideration applies in "countries where a high proportion of
politicians consists of men with legal training or where, to all intents
and purposes, all politicians come from the legal profession." (p. 28)
Practical grounds also justify the inclusion of public international law
since "questions connected therewith may arise when a case is being
heard before a national court . . . ." (p. 28) Finally, it is argued that
"this 'practical' type of legal education may, without suffering distortion,
extend to the study of obsolete legal systems," including of course the
history of the national system. (p. 28)
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When he examines the teaching of law for scientific purposes Profes-
sor Eisenmann takes a position that, he believes, "departs from tradi-
tional and current practice . . . ." (p. 29) He characterizes law as "the
whole field of what is 'juridical.'" "Moreover the science of law, in its
full and ideal sense, can only exist in virtue of a knowledge of every
phenomenon and problem connected with the subject as thus defined."
(p. 29) He draws the following sweeping inferences relating to the
"sciences of law":
Rationally speaking, the expression 'science of law' denotes, first of all,
the whoe [sic] body of knowledge connected with law, indiscriminately
unitemized; in that sense, it covers and combines the entire group of dif-
ferent disciplines dealing with the phenomena and problems of law. If,
in practice, it has been and still is almost wholly monopolized by one of
those disciplines, treating of only one branch of the relevant problems
and knowledge, there are probably historical reasons for this; the disci-
pline in question was the first to be instituted, and was for long the only
one taught; not until much later did most of the disciplines concerned
with other problems begin to be taken up systematically or to make any
headway. But today, possibly, this monopoly is simply a survival of the
past, no longer reflecting the present position or modem ideas. In that
case, conclusions drawn by rational analysis should not be obscured by
mere conventionality of language. . . . [I]t is far better to describe
as 'legal science' the discipline usually termed 'science of law', and to
keep the term 'science' or 'science of law' for the broader group to which,
logically, it applies . . . . (p. 30)
In expounding the scientific objective, Professor Eisenmann examines
the approaches that are concerned, respectively, with what "must" be
law and what "is" law, and with the gradation between "legislation" and
the application of legislation. His view is that problems of legislation
come within the scope of the science of law, and he rejects the claim
that "the science of law comprises solely the analysis of the rules of
positive law . . . ." (P. 53)
The option that lies open to the organizers of legal education, then, is
this: "which - 'practical' teaching or 'scientific' teaching- corresponds
best to the idea of higher university education?" (p. 55) The proposition
is underlined that practical and scientific teaching are not entirely dif-
ferent. On the contrary, scientific teaching maintains the first "but com-
pletes it by incorporating it into a larger and more diversified unit."
(P. 55) Hence the conclusion is that teaching "for purely practical
purposes" cannot be accepted as university teaching in the true sense.
It is evident that Professor Eisenmann has made a valiant attempt to
clarify an integrative conception of legal education, and that he is mak-
ing every effort to carry conviction to colleagues whose conception of
the field is more traditional and circumscribed. Within the terms of
reference of UNESCO this may be something of a tour de force. It is
pertinent to recall, however, that one of the stated alms of the report
is to influence the organization of legal studies in the countries of Africa
and the East where there are opportunities for "fresh starts" in the
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shaping of an emerging legal profession. (p. io) What is the most fruit-
ful point of departure for a program of this character?
I submit that the key question to be answered in planning educational
programs is what role persons "learned in the law" are supposed to play
in the life of the community during the years ahead. As with all prob-
lems of decision, this is a matter of clarifying the goal values and ob-
jectives to be pursued in the light of expectations about what future
developments will be if no new policies are introduced, or if alternative
policies designed to maximize net value realizations are put into effect.
Inferences about the future will depend upon available information
about historical trends and upon the state of scientific knowledge to
date. An adviser of those who make policy affecting the institutions of
legal instruction will have individual views in which are reflected the
impact of past circumstances and his own originality. Obviously an ad-
viser who wants to influence policy will take into full account the value
goals and specific interpretations of those who take immediate or even-
tual steps affecting the structure of legal education. What working as-
sumptions are to be made concerning the system of public order and
the roles to be performed by professional groups whose principal cap-
ital is their knowledge of the authoritative and probably controlling
prescriptions of a body politic?
It is quite impossible to deal relevantly with the issues at stake unless
assumptions are made about the fundamental orientation of those who
engage in the making of authoritative and controlling decisions in the
emerging body politic. If we assume that the overriding goal calls for
the attainment of a society in which human dignity is realized in theory
and fact we are likely to create a different system of legal instruction
than if we take it for granted that the overriding objective is the ag-
grandizement of a ruling few. Where the conception of human dignity
is the professed ideal, systems of legal education are profoundly affected
by the specific interpretations given to the idea; hence it is essential
to consider what specific interpretations will in all probability prevail
in the shaping and sharing of such values as wealth, respect, enlighten-
ment, skill, rectitude, affection, well-being, and power.
Working hypotheses about future lines of development call for esti-
mates of the speed and scope of industrialization; the transformation of
the class structure of society; the degree of effective democratic partici-
pation through various authoritative forms; the probable recruitment
of the higher decision-making positions from among persons heavily or
lightly indoctrinated with particular sacred or secular ideologies; the
scope of monopoly and competition in the market and in the forums of
public enlightenment; the degree of freedom or subordination to the elites
of foreign powers (with specifiable policies); and so on through the
institutional components of the system of public order.
Beginning with hypotheses of this character it is practicable to fore-
see, and perhaps to influence by clarification or persuasion, the role of
the lawyer in a given body politic. It is possible to foresee and to affect
decision makers; and especially to predict which perspectives and opera-
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tional techniques they are likely to possess, or which would be the de-
sirable means of effectuating the goals of the preferred system of public
order. A policy maker who is concerned with legal studies must make up
his mind which perspectives and operational techniques of the emerging
elite are to be defined as "legal knowledge and skill" and, which are to
be called by other names. Will the planner define "skill in diplomatic
negotiation" or in "mediation" and "conciliation" as "legal"? If so,
what are the requisite qualities of character, and what methods of ap-
praisal will ensure that the most appropriate individuals are chosen to
exercise these functions or to receive special instruction designed to
improve their effectiveness?
It is, of course, possible -and in some systems of public order de-
sirable - to restrict the definition of "legal skills" in such a manner that
it is taken for granted that only a few members of the authoritative and
controlling elite of the body politic will be "lawyers." In such a case,
the problem of legal education is to create suitable means of selecting and
training specialists for the purpose of performing certain advisory func-
tions, such as anticipating the arguments to be put forward in transna-
tional diplomatic negotiation among governmental or private parties.
It may be decided that those who qualify as advisers on legal prescrip-
tions will be disqualified from taking top roles in legislative and policy-
executing functions. The "judging role," for instance, may be regarded
as so crucial to the system of public order that it is exclusively reserved
to those who have a broader than "legal" experience.
If it be assumed that the decision makers of the community should
and can be elected or appointed from among persons who have "legal"
skills, it is appropriate for a planner's definition of "legal perspectives
and operational techniques" to be relatively broad. In a democratic
body politic the proper aim of legal education then becomes the prepara-
tion of a large number of potential decision makers who are qualified to
defend and extend the public order of a free society.
One daring alternative in a democratic or a democratizing polity is
to extend the role of legal training to include civic education in its en-
tirety; while planning to have a few highly specialized lawyers, legal
instruction may be made a major emphasis from primary school through
every level of general education. Instruction in "fair play" on the play-
ground and in the home would be explicitly labeled "legal," and the
members of the body politic would live in an ideologically unified world
in which the settlement and prevention of disputes, as well as the articu-
lation of common objectives, would be part of a continuous exercise in
the acquisition and mastery of a basic orientation.
Essential to the programming of legal instruction is the rate at which
the most specialized skill group is to be recruited. The matter is vital
where societies are in rapid transition toward industrial forms of life.
We have had many occasions to observe the personal and collective dis-
organization that results when schools and colleges succeed in transform-
ing the sons and daughters of the peasantry or of the lesser nobility into
a "white collar proletariat" with upward aspirations.
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In many emerging societies a strategic task is the blending of the new
state of affairs with "underlying" folk cultures. If legal education is to
smooth the transition from "folk" to "civilization," full account must
be taken of the law (or law equivalents) among native peoples. It may
be wise to provide for off-campus "workshops" located among the Indian
tribes (in Latin America) or the tribes of Africa. Instructional proce-
dures may be aimed at familiarizing tribal leaders (and students) with
the larger system that affects them, or at acquainting urban leaders and
students with local life.
It. is clear, I think, that when basic questions pertinent to legal educa-
tion arise we cannot usefully condense the options into such categories
as "practical" or "scientific." Pertinent criteria are diverse; they de-
pend upon the aims and images of the future of the body politic whose
problems of legal education are under consideration. Even the ancient
terminology of jurisprudential discourse - the "dogmatic" or the "posi-
tive" - play subordinate roles in a comprehensive conception of the
patterns of thought appropriate to the study or the guidance of decision
processes. We accept the bare inventory provided in this report of some
of the curricular arrangements in eleven countries as a useful though
elementary contribution to the subject at hand. If, however, considera-
tions of political expediency are of such importance that an agency like
UNESCO cannot sponsor reports that deal expressly with the most
significant questions of public order, and the place of lawyers therein,
the inference is inescapable that other auspices are needed to cope with
the questions nominally treated in the present publication.
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IL CONTRATTO. Problemi Fondamentali Trattati con il Metodo Com-
parativo e Casistico. By Gino Gorla.1 Milan: Antonino Giuffr6.
1954. Vol. I: Lineamenti Generali. Pp. xiv, 529. Vol. II: Casistica
e Problemi. Pp. xv, 663. Lire 7,000.
Professor Gorla's book is an exceptional work, both in its application
of the comparative method and in its reliance on a rich collection of
selected cases. It is a novel attempt to present to the students of civil-
law countries a book very much on the pattern of the American case-
book, with copious annotations and questions. On the other hand,
those familiar with casebooks will also find the approach original, since
the first volume of the work, a monographic discussion of the topic,
refers to the cases in the second volume as illustrations of the ideas and
conclusions expressed in the first. To this approach Professor Gorla
brings his broad knowledge not only of several civil-law systems, with
emphasis on Italian and French law, but of Anglo-American law, view-
ing each system in the light of its historical development. His method
is thus comparative in the best sense of the word, drawing both terri-
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